Air Power: The Men, Machines, and Ideas That Revolutionized War, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II

by Stephen Budiansky

Book Overview

Even Before the Wright Brothers' First Flight, predictions abounded of the devastating and terrible consequences this new invention would have as an engine of war. Soaring over the battlefield and the... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0670032859
• ISBN13: 9780670032853
• Release Date: April 2004
• Publisher: Viking Books
• Length: 518 Pages
• Weight: 0.60 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.6" x 6.5" x 9.3"

Customer Reviews

War and Peace

Before the Wright Brothers ever flew, authors like HG Wells were predicting that vast destruction would be wrought from the air in any future conflict. This is the story of how aviation technology slowly, fitfully came to deliver on that promise. From the first short hops at Kitty Hawk, Budiansky takes the reader from the anticlimactic debut of heavier than air craft in the Italo-Turkish war to the awesome power of the USAF during the two Gulf Wars. Without neglecting the obvious great battles and aircraft, he emphasises crucial peacetime developments, in both aircraft design and the equally important realm of tactics and strategy, that did so much to shape how wars were fought. The book has some minor flaws. British and American development of such technologies as the jet engine, radar, and swept wings are given exhaustive treatment, at the end of which we are informed that, by the way, the Germans had also made these inventions years before. It is also unfortunate to end any piece of writing with the statement "Rumsfeld was right". While the second Gulf war was a technological and military triumph, we are given no hint of the morass Iraq was to become or how ineffective all weather medium level precision bombing is against an urban insurgency. But these jarring notes are insufficient to spoil a masterpiece. Budiansky leaves us with the irony that air power has achieved its greatest success in the battlefield role that ambitious officers have been trying to escape since the beginning.

A clearer view

I cosider myself as a well read aviation person, further an old Naval pilot. This well written and easy reading book opened my eyes to a welth of information! I would recomend it to any serious student of aviation!

"Revolutions in Military Affairs" in the Sky

I'm always a little wary of long history books written by journalists, who sometimes present history as a tedious interview of various "sources." Stephen Budiansky, a correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, is a happy exception to the rule. His prose is clear and crisp, and he tells an engaging story in a way that kept drawing me back to his rather hefty "Air Power." Budiansky begins his book by explaining why the accomplishments of the Wright Brothers were so remarkable. He then renders a detailed history of the military uses, both real and imagined, of aircraft. The result is a story of a rapidly emerging technology told against the background of the military theories of the 20th and early 21st century. Throughout his book, Budiansky takes issue with the views of theorists and generals who claimed that air power could be a "war-winning" weapon, either because it could be used to terrorize civilian populations into surrender or because it could cause rapid economic collapse by striking at the chokepoints in an enemy's supply system. The author argues that, with very few exceptions (such as the interdiction of German oil supplies in the last year of World War II), air power has not performed very well as a strategic tool and has always been far more effective when used as a tactical weapon in support of forces on the ground. In this sense, the Second Gulf War in Iraq can be viewed as the apotheosis of the effective use of air power: with the advent of readily available precision weapons, even "strategic" aircraft such as the B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers have been used to great advantage in the role of close support of ground troops. In the aftermath of the opening phases of the Second Gulf War, air power is for the moment ascendant on the battle field. But if there is anything to be learned from Budiansky's meticulous history, it is that military innovation is a very Darwinian business. Plenty of bright people are studying the successful American and British invasion of Iraq, trying to make sure that the air power strategy used in that conflict will work just as well in the next war--or, for those worried about being on the receiving end, trying to prevent that strategy from working at all.

A techno-historical page turner

This book has just the right mix of fascinating anecdote, illuminating technical detail, and historical exposition to make it both an entertaining read and deeply informative. As a pilot with a background in physics I especially liked the fact that Budiansky's technical explanations were generally clear concise and accurate. Probably the most important thing to take out of this book is how a military doctrine can become so ingrained that it survives for decades despite voluminous empircal evidence to the contrary.

The Use and Abuse of Air Power

I'm always a little wary of long history books written by journalists, who sometimes present history as a tedious interview of various "sources." Stephen Budiansky, a correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, is a happy exception to the rule. His prose is clear and crisp, and he tells an engaging story in a way that kept drawing me back to his rather hefty "Air Power."Budiansky begins his book by explaining why the accomplishments of the Wright Brothers were so remarkable. He then renders a detailed history of the military uses, both real and imagined, of aircraft. The result is a story of a rapidly emerging technology told against the background of the military theories of the 20th and early 21st century.Throughout his book, Budiansky takes issue with the views of theorists and generals who claimed that air power could be a "war-winning" weapon, either because it could be used to terrorize civilian populations into surrender or because it could cause rapid economic collapse by striking at the chokepoints in an enemy's supply system. The author argues that, with very few exceptions (such as the interdiction of German oil supplies in the last year of World War II), air power has not performed very well as a strategic tool and has always been far more effective when used as a tactical weapon in support of forces on the ground. In this sense, the Second Gulf War in Iraq can be viewed as the apotheosis of the effective use of air power: with the advent of readily available precision weapons, even "strategic" aircraft such as the B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers have been used to great advantage in the role of close support of ground troops. In the aftermath of the opening phases of the Second Gulf War, air power is for the moment ascendant on the battle field. But if there is anything to be learned from Budiansky's meticulous history, it is that military innovation is a very Darwinian business. Plenty of bright people are studying the successful American and British invasion of Iraq, trying to make sure that the air power strategy used in that conflict will work just as well in the next war--or, for those worried about being on the receiving end, trying to prevent that strategy from working at all.