A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945

by Trevor N. Dupuy

Book Overview

No Synopsis Available.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0133511146
• ISBN13: 9780133511147
• Release Date: January 1977
• Publisher: Prentice Hall
• Length: 362 Pages
• Weight: 1.85 lbs.

Customer Reviews

A Monumental Study of the German General Staff

Trevor N. Dupuy's work, "A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945" is a first rate look at German military theory and practice over roughly a century and a half. Dupuy's central thesis is that Germany's General Staff created a institution of military excellence designed to produce officers with exceptional strategic abilities. Dupuy's research is exhaustive and lends credence to his argument. For instance, the fact that both Erich Ludendorff and Max Hoffman independently came up with the same strategy to counter the Russian attack before Tannenberg is attributed by Dupuy to Germany's General Staff system. This book is filled with keen insight that will delight military historians and casual readers both.

There are better books about the General Staff

This is an interesting and well written book that purports to address the question of why the German military was superior to all other armies, in victory and defeat, for more than 125 years. Dupuy claims that it was the result of the institutionalization of military excellence in the General Staff. In the end, Dupuy's claims are not well supported by his text. It is not at all clear why the German General Staff was superior to the French (or that of any other country's) military leadership. The relationship between the German General Staff and the average foot soldier is also unexplored. If the Staff was the key element, why couldn't they lead the Turkish and/or Austria-Hungarian armies to victory in WWI? The idea of making the General Staff a scientific instrument from which men of ability and energy would naturally rise to the top was clearly a great strength of the German military, but it doesn't tell the whole story of German military successes during this period. I would argue that this book is not so much about the General Staff as about the relationship between the Staff and the political leadership of Germany/Prussia from 1815 to 1945. There are short vignettes of most of the General Staff leadership, and much of the book is taken up describing the political machinations between the military and political leadership. The strongest parts of the this book are the discussion (and consequences) of the loss of civilian control of the German military after the Franco-Prussion War, and the confused political and military maneuverings after the defeat of Germany in WWI. If one is truly interested in learning about the General Staff, this is not the best choice. This book does not describe the General Staff as an institution (i.e. the details of how it functioned). Better references are listed by some of the other reviewers. Overall, an interesting and easy read, but it misses it's stated mark. My strongest impression after reading this book is that English language biographies of Scharnhorst and Halder need to be written.

A clear, concise summary

The impetus for writing this book came while Trevor Depuy was constructing a mathematical model for a World War II wargame based on the records of actual engagements between the Germans and Allies. Much to his surprise, he learned that even after several years of total war, homeland bombardment and facing numerically superior enemies, the Germans still retained a 30% edge in combat effectiveness. That is, on the battlefields of Europe in 1944, 100 German troops were the equivalent 130 US or British troops. He wanted to know how and why these "defeated" German armies could fight so well? The answer to the riddle of superior German combat effectiveness, Depuy says, has nothing to do with genetic or cultural traits of aggressiveness or obedience to authority, as others have suggested. Rather, he argues that the superiority was a deliberate product of the German General Staff, which was incredibly successful in its mission of institutionalizing military excellence through extremely competitive officer selection processes, advanced training, an emphasis on military history and individual initiative in combat, and a commitment to objectivity in planning and analysis. Indeed, Depuy says the General Staff was able to institutionalize military genius, usually found only in rare individuals such as Hannibal, Gustavus Adolphus, Napoleon and others in the pantheon of military greats. As abhorrent as Nazi policies may have been - and as culpable as the officer corps may have been in the atrocities of the Nazi regime by either direct collaboration or failure to intervene - Depuy argues that nothing can take away from the fact that the German army consistently out-planned, out-manuevered, and out-fought the Allies. Moreover, they often accomplished these feats against incredible odds, including significantly smaller forces, lack of air superiority, and the complete compromise of their operational plans through successful Allied code-breaking efforts.It should be noted that while Depuy's work is highly readable and sound on facts, it is far from original. His citations - which are few and far between - come almost exclusively from secondary sources. Depuy doesn't make any significant contribution to our understanding of the General Staff, its genesis, development and accomplishments beyond what Ritter ("The Sword and Scepter"), Craig ("The Politics of the Prussian Army"), Goerlitz ("A History of the German General Staff") and others have already made. These three sources, in particular, clearly were the foundation of Depuy's work, although he does, at times, take issue with some of their conclusions. Its lack of originality doesn't mean the book is without value or virtue. Indeed, for those looking for a concise review of the history of the German General Staff with a distinct focus on how it influenced combat effectiveness, and not wishing to delve into a book long on details and thoroughly academic in nature, Depuy's "A Genius for War" may be the

More than military history

I would like to add these points to the comments of the Texas reviewer:This is more than military history - it's a rigorous and convincing demonstration that organization matters, and the correct approach to organization development can affect the course of history.The book had its beginning in Dupuy's discovery that his standard simulation did not match the facts. Rather than ignore the discrepancy, he set out to find out what was wrong with the simulation, and the result is this admirable book.Counter-historians can ask what would have happened if the king of Prussia had not been able to have Gerhard von Scharnhorst head his Military Reorganization Commission after the disastrous defeat of 1806. Authors between projects can ask themselves why there is no biography in English of Scharnhorst.

Excellent and Highly Intellectual!

Right at the very beginning, and at the conclusion, Dupuy corrected some of the most common stereotypes in our minds: the Prussia/German armed force has no monopoly on discipline nor soldierly quality; historically speaking, German people has no obvious warlike nor militaristic tendency, compared with Romans, Celts, Vikings, Mongols, Turks; from the outstanding performance of the current Bundeswehr, a democratic and constitutional government can go hand in hand with military effectiveness; from the expansionist colonial policy of Britain, France, and US in 19th century, and that of Rome and Athens in ancient time, democracy does not necessarily prevent military aggression; military genius like Napoleon, Hannibal etc are not free from making bad mistakes, we call them genius partly because their opponents outblundered them.This book gives very thorough and insightful analysis of how military genius and effectiveness are systemmatically institutionalized ever since General Scharnhorst proposed this concept in late 18th century. General Scharnhorst, after the Prussian defeat at Jena, together with Gneisenau, Boyen, Grolman and Clausewitz (the 5 "Reformers") pioneered in theories of General Staff as a self-perpetuating institution in maintaining an armed force at the highest readiness for war, and transforming theories into doctrine and organization.The unmatchable military excellence of the Prusso-German General Staff and Army were demonstrated throughout the 19th-20th century, and chronologically illustrated in the book . Its influence endures up to now and future.Ever since 1807, Prussia-Germany no longer has to count on the rise of genius like Napoleon or Frederick the Great to win battles; the General Staff respond and adapt to changes, continuously update and upgrade itself, study military experience and history with seriousness and objectiveness, produce intellectual and intelligent officers to direct, plan, coordinate and prepare for wars, and even defeat opposing armies that were led by genius!Dupuy has written such a splendid book of wisdom, I highly recommend this book for anyone who is interested in modern European military history, probably one of the best of its kind.