1943: the Victory That Never Was

By John Grigg

Book Overview

On 6 June 1944, D Day, Allied troops landed in France, opening the way to eventual history. In this controversial reappraisal of the course of World War II, John Grigg suggests that the Allied... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: B001IKGTMY
• Release Date: January 1980
• Publisher: NY: Hill and Wang.
• Length: 248 Pages
• Weight: 0.90 lbs.

Customer Reviews

Coulda shoulda woulda . . .

They say hindsight is always 20/20. Whoever they are, they haven't read much alternate history, in which the passage of time serves only to multiply the might have beens. Could the Americans and British have finished Germany more quickly? This could have saved millions of lives, mostly Soviet, Jewish and German. John Grigg thinks so, and he has a definite idea about how to do it: a cross-channel invasion in 1943. Was this viable or just a dream? He argues that there were four necessary material conditions: air superiority, sufficient troops, transport, and the ability to stop the Germans concentrating; and that the Allies had, or could have had, all of them. Air superiority is often used as an argument against a 1943 invasion, since the German air force was not decisively defeated until early 1944. However, if the Americans could single-handedly defeat the German fighters at long range over Germany, hampered by extra fuel tanks and the need to escort bombers, surely the Americans and British together could have prevailed at much closer range over and across the Channel, even a year earlier. As for the troops, the numbers were certainly there - over a hundred divisions. One wonders whether they were all adequately trained and in the right place, but as Grigg points out, in Sicily there were 150 000 troops ashore in the first three days and a total of over half a million. In shipping, the problem was similarly one of allocation: during the Sicily invasion nine divisions were simultaneously afloat, as opposed to seven at Normandy; and there were sufficient landing craft if they hadn't all been sent to the Pacific. The last condition is the most problematic. Perhaps the Allies could have landed in comparable force a year early, with sufficient air superiority to stop the Luftwaffe disrupting the invasion. Yet if the Germans had been able to concentrate their armor against the beachead, it would have been in trouble. This was prevented in the actual invasion, mostly by an intense two month bombing campaign which destroyed railways and roads, bridges and tunnels all over France. Even if the Luftwaffe was defeated, seizing air superiority is one thing; using it effectively quite another. And it is not clear that the Allied bomber force in 1943 could have done the job that it did in 1944, particularly if the strategic air offensive had been put on the back burner to concentrate on an earlier invasion. Thus the material factors all seem plausible, except perhaps the last. But good alternate history must take account of subjective factors - consistency with the knowledge and ideas of the time - as well as the objective material situation. This test is passed easily, since no less an authority than George Marshall was strongly in favour of a 1943 invasion. (Stalin and the western Communist parties, of course, were pushing for the operation a year earlier.) Even Churchill was not so much against the idea as distracted by all his ot

Not Perfect, but an intriguing piece

Grigg's book is not a perfect piece of history and historiography, but it is a very intriguing one. He lays out why a 1943 D-Day (invasion of Europe by the Western Allies) both could have happened, and should have happened. Anyone who enjoys alternative history (what-if) will be engaged by this line of argument. If you like to study grand strategy, again you likely will enjoy this book. There are flaws in the book, but they are pretty minor, and most are arguable points anyway (as much of history is). The end result, for me (and I believe a 1943 invasion would have been better for the world, overall) was an acceptance that it could have been, and might have been a better result than the 1944 invasion. By going through the exercise of arguing for and explaining mechanics of a 1943 invasion, you can gather a reasonably good understanding of the challenges facing allied military (and political) leaders, and the realities of and America that was not ready for a world war. Basically, that's it in a nutshell. Below I'll lay out just a few key items that I recall from reading it some years back, for anyone interested. Among the points he makes in the book as to why a 1943 invasion could succeed (or was possible), or was a better plan: * The Atlantic Wall - it was far weaker in 1943 than it was a year later, as Rommel took command, inspected and ordered a massive fortification effort to take place. Previously, German defenses were largely focused on the ports (Dieppe, Calais, Cherbourg, etc.), and the British Channel Islands, not on the long lines of beaches. * The German army was engaged much more deeply inside the USSR in 1943 than it was a year later. This is true, and easily seen when one looks at map of the eastern front in 1943 vs. 1944 (e.g., before Kursk), where the Germans were well into the Ukraine, on doorsteps of Leningrad (St. Petersburg now), and still held the Crimea. This means that the German army is further away, and it is harder to redeploy forces to the west. * German occupation forces - they were much weaker in 1943 than they were in 1944. Although the German army overall suffered a great deal of losses in that year, the first rate formations assigned to western europe in 1943 were small compared to 1944. The primary reason for this was simply that Hitler and the OKW understood that the Allies WOULD attack in 1944, and that this invasion must be repelled. * France - Grigg believes that it is more important to get France back into the war, than it was to get Italy out of it. While I cannot be so sure of this argument, you will have to make your own decision. One thing to note (which I don't think Grigg did) is that the Italians switched sides, they didn't just quit the Axis. Though their MILITARY assistance to the allies wasn't that significant, they did commit combat troops and a lot of logistics/labor troops to the cause, in addition to large numbers of partisans in northern Italy. Arguments against - which he usual